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IS THERE A NEGLIGENT CIVIL BATTERYI
In recent years there has been some discussion concerning
the negligent battery in criminal law.' Since, m many instances,
the law of torts is similar to the crinmnal law, the problem is
presented whether or not in civil law there may be such a battery
based upon the negligence of the defendant.
The overwhelming weight of authority is that an intent to
cause a harmful contact with the person of another is an
essential element of a civil battery There are, however, various
ways used by the courts to find this intent. If the act which
causes the injury is a lawful one, it is necessary to prove an
actual intent to maintain an action for battery 2 But, if the act
itself is unlawful, then the intent of the wrongdoer is immaterial,
because it is held that the actor intended to do the unlawful act
and that intent is sufficient to sustain an action for assault and
battery 3 Likewise, where the defendant's act was wanton and
reckless, showing an utter disregard for the consequences (that
is, where the act amounts to crininal negligence) and the plaintiff
suffers injury, then the actor will be presumed to have intended
those consequences;4 or from reckless and wanton conduct, the
courts may find a constructive intent to do the harm which the
plaintiff sustains. 5
In each instance, the court grants relief on the ground of an
intentional battery It is obvious that there is no real intent to
cause the injury except in the first case where the actor is performing a lawful act. There it must be shown that the defendant
actually intended to injure the person of the plaintiff or some
'Hall, Assault and Battery by the Reckless Motorist (1940-41)

31 J.2 Crun. L. 133.
Paxton v. Boyer, 67 Ill. 132 (1873), Hitzelberger v. Kanter, 181
Ill. App. 459 (1913), Biggins v. Gulf, C. & S. F Ry., 102 Tex. 417, 118

S. W 125 (1909)
'Peterson v. Haffner, 59 Ind. 130, 26 Am. R. 81 (1887), Bocher v.
Trainer, 172 Mo. App. 376, 157 S. W 848 (1913), Carmichael v.
Dolan, 25 Neb. 335, 41 N. W 178 (1889), Rolater v. Strain, 39 Okla.
572, 137 Pac. 96, 50 L. R. A. (N. S.) 880 (1913), Vosburg v Putney,
80 Wis. 523, 50 N. W 403 (1891).
'Land v. Backman, 223 Ill. App. 473 (1921), Mercer v Corbin,
117 Ind. 450, 20 N. E. 132 (1889)
'Reynolds v. Pierson, 29 Ind. App. 273, 64 N. E. 484 (1902).
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third person. In all other eases, an implied intent or constructive intent is substituted for actual intent.
The language of the courts to the effect that one is presumed
to have intended the natural and probable consequences of Ins
acts, or that from one's reckless acts a constructive or inplied
intent may be deduced cannot make negligent acts intentional.
'Whenever courts resort to such language it is merely to allow
recovery where there is no other way for them to grant relief.
The use of presumptions and implications usually signifies a
transition in the law. It is but an attempt upon the part of the
courts to get away from the requirement of actual intent for
recovery in the case of a civil battery Since, through the application of established principles, relief cannot be granted for
a negligent battery, judges find a constructive intent in negligent
acts and through this medium satisfy the actual rules of tort law
as they exist today.The present crimial law is n this transitional period and
has advanced to the stage in which some cases 6 have already held
that there can be a criminal negligent battery At the present
time, most courts use vague, fictitional phrases to hold one liable
for what amounts to a civil negligent battery, however, one
state, Alabama, allows' recovery in such a case7 In that state,
the courts declare that an intent to injure is not essential to the
liability of the person committing the assault and battery
It is submitted that instead of camouflaging their actions
and hiding behind constructive and implied intent, the courts
should allow a recovery for a battery resulting from mere civil
negligence. Although all the states except Alabama expressly
repudiate such a theory, n reality, they grant relief for the civil
negligent battery Each time a court holds that an intent may

91

5Note (1942) 30 Ky. L. J. 418.
Honeycutt v. Louis Pizitz Dry Goods Co., 235 Ala. 507, 180 So.
(1938) is the only Alabama case having a factual situation

involving negligence. In that case plaintiff was injured when
defendant negligently threw a lollipop into a crowd and struck plaintiff in the eye. The action was for an assault and battery and the
court allowed the case to be submitted to the jury on the basis of the
negligence of defendant. This decision was based upon a long line
of dictum cases: Pizitz v. Blomburgh, 208 Ala. 136, 89 So. 287 (1921),
Birmingham Ry., Light & Power Co. v. Coleman, 181 Ala. 478, 61 So.

890, 892 (1913), Seigel v. Long, 169 Ala. 79, 53 So. 753, 754 (1910);
Carlton v. Henry, 129 Ala. 479, 29 So. 924, 925 (1901), Thomason v.
Gray, 82 Ala. 291, 3 So. 38, 39 (1887); Chapman v The State, 78 Ala.
463, 465 (1885).
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be inplied from defendant's crunmally negligent acts, or that
the consequences may be presumed from his original act, it is
really basing plaintiff's recovery upon a negligent battery The
time has come to discard these subterfuges, face the actual results
of the decisions today, and recognize the civil negligent battery
as a basis for tort liability
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